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Summary: Why do risk premia vary over time? We examine this problem theoretically and empirically by studying the effect of
market belief on risk premia. Individual belief is taken as a fundamental, primitive,  state variable. Market belief is observable, it is
central to the empirical evaluation and we show how to measure it. Our asset pricing model is familiar from the noisy REE literature
but we adapt it to an economy with diverse beliefs. We derive equilibrium asset prices and implied risk premium. Our approach
permits a closed form solution of prices hence we trace the exact effect of market belief on the time variability of asset prices and
risk premia. We test empirically the theoretical conclusions.
Our main result is that, above the effect of business cycles on risk premia, fluctuations in market belief have significant
independent effect on the time variability of risk premia. We study the premia on long positions in Federal Funds Futures, 3-month
and 6-month Treasury Bills. The annual mean risk premium on holding such assets for 1-12 months is about 40-60 basis points and
we find that, on average, the component of market belief in the risk premium exceeds 50% of the mean. Since time variability of
market belief is large, this component frequently exceeds 50% of the mean premium. This component is larger the shorter is the
holding period of an asset and it dominates the premium for very short holding returns of less than 2 months. As to the structure of
the premium we show that when the market holds abnormally favorable belief about the future payoff of an asset the market views
the long position as less risky hence the risk premium on that asset declines. More generally, periods of market optimism (i.e. “bull”
markets) are shown to be periods when the market risk premium is low while in periods of pessimism (i.e. “bear” markets) the
market’s risk premium is high. Fluctuations in risk premia are thus inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future
prospects of asset payoffs. This effect is strong and economically very significant.
JEL classification: C53, D8, D84, E27, E4, G12, G14.
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0. Introduction
Market risk premia vary over time and their fluctuations are a major cause of asset price
volatility. But what drives changes in risk premia?  The standard rational expectations answer relates
changes in risk premia to changes in information about exogenous fundamentals which correctly alter
the market’s assessment of future risky events, the most important of which are business cycles. Such a
view implies that excess returns are predictable by changes in observed fundamentals which, in turn,
explain market volatility. Although there is some empirical support for this view, it cannot be the full
explanation. Asset prices are not explained well by fundamental factors and, as Paul Samuelson used
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2 to quip, the market has forecasted nine of the last five recessions.
An alternative perspective holds that, in addition to exogenous fundamental conditions, the bulk
of asset returns’ volatility is caused by fluctuations in market beliefs. We hold the view that agents do
not know the true economic dynamics since it is a non-stationary system with time varying structure
that changes faster than can be learned with precision from data. With diverse beliefs, a large fraction of
price volatility is then endogenously generated. This component is called Endogenous Uncertainty.
Papers reflecting these ideas include Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985), (1989), Harris and
Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Kurz (1974), (1994), (1997), (2008), (2009) Kurz and
Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001), Kurz and Schneider (1996), Kurz and Wu (1996),
Motolese (2001), (2003), Nakata (2007), Nielsen (1996), (2003), (2011), Wu and Guo (2003), (2004),
Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni (2011), Guo, Wang and Wu (2011). On monetary policy and aggregate
fluctuations see Kurz Jin and Motolese (2005b), Branch and Evans (2006), (2011), Branch and
McGough (2011), De Grauwe (2011), Wieland and Wolters (2011). On equity premium see Kurz and
Motolese (2001) and Kurz Jin and Motolese (2005a). However, our earlier papers study risk premia via
simulations. They do not study determinants of risk premia either analytically or empirically. 
In this paper we study the effect of market belief on the structure of risk premia. Beliefs are
diverse but individually rational in a sense to be defined. Our problem is to establish the relation
between market belief and market risk premia. We derive analytic results which are then tested
empirically by using data on the market distribution of beliefs. Observations on market belief are
extracted from data on monthly forecasts of future interest rates and macro economic variables
compiled by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BLUF) since 1983. A market state of belief is a
distribution of individual beliefs and in the theoretical and empirical analysis we focus on the first two
moments. Since an agent’s perceived risk premium is the conditional expectation of excess returns of an
asset, an economy where agents hold diverse beliefs has many subjectively perceived risk premia.
The literature on excess returns and risk premia is large. We mention a few papers which report
on convincing evidence gathered in recent years against the expectations hypothesis (e.g. Fama and
Bliss (1987), Stambaugh (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004)). They show that investments in Treasury securities generate predictable
excess returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) exhibit predictable excess holding returns in bond markets
3while Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) find excess returns in two futures markets: Fed Funds futures in
1988:10 - 2003:12 and Eurodollar futures in 1985:Q2-2003:Q4. “Predictability” is used here in the
sense of exhibiting long term statistical correlation between current information and future excess
returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) do not estimate structural
models to explain the source of excess returns but deduce such returns from estimated reduced form
models for forecasting returns. Broadly speaking, they argue that bond excess returns are associated
with business cycles and for this reason they use pro-cyclical variables such as current yields or year
over year growth rate of Non Farm Payroll (in short NFP) to predict excess returns. 
There is a large literature in empirical finance that is compatible with our approach and which
uses measures of market belief to forecast returns. A sample includes Miller (1977), DeLong et al.
(1990), Lee et al.(2002), Diether et al.(2002), Johnson (2004), Park (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006)
and Campbell and Diebold (2009). Also, models with diverse beliefs have become the basis for recent
work in Behavioral Finance. The literature in empirical finance cited mostly searches for measures to be
used to forecast returns, and this is definitely not our aim. From a theoretical perspective the cited
literature always takes the view that diverse beliefs reflect irrational behavior. Hence, the Behavioral
Finance perspective is compatible with the Noise Trading view proposed by DeLong et al.(1990), and a
Noise Trading view is the universal theoretical basis for the above literature in empirical finance. Our
approach is to outline a theory of rational diverse beliefs and deduce from it empirical implications
which can then be tested with market data. The present paper carries out this program. 
To clarify the theoretical clash involved we note that in a Noise Trading world there are smart
traders who know the truth and not-so-smart traders who trade aimlessly. Equilibrium reflects both the
truth and the noise. We are not aware of any data on noise trading or on agents who declare themselves
as noise traders. Hence, in our view noise trading theory cannot be falsified with data. In contrast, our
theory proposes all traders are smart but lack knowledge of the true stochastic market dynamics. The
true dynamics is time varying and due to complexity cannot be learned by anyone. Since investors know
only empirical distributions deduced from data, equilibrium asset prices are determined only by what
traders believe and by what they know. The true dynamics is irrelevant to asset pricing except for the
way it reveals itself in the data agents know. Thus, lack of full knowledge of the truth is the foundation
of belief diversity but rational diversity is not noise; it has a structure and can be studied scientifically.
4Our results confirm earlier results about the effect of cyclical variables on risk premia. However,
using our perspective we show that risk premia contain a large component generated by the dynamics
of market belief. The market belief index is a state variable reflecting investor’s perceived future
returns, net of fundamental information. This state variable functions like any fundamental variable and
should be considered an externality taken as given by all. In equilibrium, fluctuations in market belief
cause large changes in risk perception of market traders. Here we study the risk premia on the holdings
of long positions in Federal Funds Futures, 3-month and 6-month Treasury Bills. The annualized mean
risk premium on holding such assets for 1-12 months is about 40-60 basis points and we find that, on
average, the component of market belief in the risk premium exceeds 50% of the mean. Since the time
variability of market belief is large, this component is frequently larger than 50% of the mean premium.
We find that this component is larger the shorter is the holding period of an asset.
We focus on two sets of results. First we show analytically and empirically that much of the
time variability of market risk premium is generated endogenously by the dynamics of beliefs. Second,
we show that the effect of market belief on the risk premium takes a specific form. When the market
holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset  the risk premium on long positions of
that asset falls. More generally, market optimism about future economic conditions lowers the risk
premium while pessimism about future economic conditions increases it. This inverse relationship
suggests that important components of “bull” market in an asset class are likely to be abnormally
favorable market beliefs which lower risk premia on long positions during such periods. We test our
conclusions empirically in all three markets and find the data supports the theoretical findings.
1.  Asset Pricing Under Heterogenous Beliefs  
1.1 An Illustrative Decision Model
Consider an asset or a portfolio of assets whose market price is , paying an exogenous riskypt
sequence { } under a true and unknown probability  which is non-stationary due toDt , t'1 ,2 ,... Πˆ
structural changes over time. Let  be the riskless interest rate,  and hence excess return overrt Rt'1% rt
the riskless rate is . The risk premium over the riskless rate is the conditional(1/pt)(pt%1%Dt%1&Rtpt)
expectations of excess returns. Since it is a function of equilibrium prices, a risk premium - as a function
of state variables - is best deduced from equilibrium prices. With this in mind, the model below is used
1 We always have finite data and cannot estimate with certainty the measure on sequences. However, if this measure
has a simple representation such as a Markov transition function, then with adequate data it can be approximated so closely as
to make the assumption in the text entirely reasonable. Estimation of  with an epsilon error only increases belief divergencemˆ
as it reduces the scope of what is common knowledge and complicates the theory without adding much empirical substance. 
2 It would be more realistic to assume the values Dt  grow and the growth rate of the values has a mean μ  rather than
the values themselves. This added realism is useful when we motivate the empirical model later but is not essential for the
analytic development.
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to deduce a closed form solution of the asset price so as to enable a study of the factors determining the
risk premium. To obtain closed form solutions we use a model which is very common in the literature
on Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (e.g. Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols
(1989), Wang (1994), He and Wang (1995), Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and others cited in
Brunnermeier (2001)). Nevertheless, our key results are fully general and do not depend upon the
specific model used. We now address a key issue. Our agents do not know the true probability  and
Πˆ
hold diverse probability beliefs about it. The fact that there are many subjective risk premia in the
market raises two questions that will be at the basis of our development in the next two sections. First,
why do agents not know the probability ? Second, what is the common knowledge basis of all agentsΠˆ
in an economy with diverse beliefs? 
Starting with the second question, our answer is past data on observables. The economy has a
set of observable variables and  is one of them. Agents have a long history of the variables, allowingDt
rich statistical analysis which leads all of them to compute the same empirical moments and the same
finite dimensional distributions of the observed variables. Using standard extension of measures they
deduce from the data a unique empirical probability measure on infinite sequences denoted by . It canmˆ
be shown that   is stationary (see Kurz (1994)) and we call it “the stationary measure.” This is themˆ
empirical knowledge shared by all agents1. We assume the data reveals that under    mˆ Dt , t'1,2,...
constitutes a Markov process where is conditionally normally distributed with means Dt%1 μ%λd(Dt&μ)
and variance 2.  is the unconditional mean of  . The unique probability  is then known to all.σ2d μ Dt mˆ
To simplify define , hence the process { } is zero mean with unknown truedt ' Dt & μ dt , t'1 ,2 ,...
probability Π and an empirical probability m. Why is m not equal to Π? With this issue in mind we turn
to the first question. 
Our economy is undergoing changes in technology and social organization. These are rapid with
major economic effects, making { } a non-stationary process. Although this means that thedt , t'1 ,2 ,...
6distributions of the ‘s are time dependent, it is more than viewing { } as a sequence ofdt dt , t'1 ,2 ,...
productivity “regimes.” It also means that, although we measure the  in a single unit of account, overdt
time the nature of assets and commodities change. Such variability makes it impossible to learn the
unknown Π. The probability  m  is merely an average over an infinite sequence of regimes, reflecting
only long term frequencies. Belief diversity starts with the fact that agents disagree over the meaning of
public information. They believe  Π  is different from m and construct models to express the
implications they see in the data. Being common knowledge, the empirical probability  m is a reference
for any concept of rationality. An agent’s model may be viewed as “extreme” but it cannot be declared
“irrational” unless proved to contradict the empirical evidence. Thus, belief rationality requires a
subjective model not to contradict the empirical evidence  m. 
Turning now to our infinite horizon model, at date t  agent i buys  shares of stock andθit
receives the payment  for each of  held. We assume the riskless rate is constant over time sodt%μ θ
i
t&1
that there is a technology by which an agent can invest the amount at date t and receive withB it
certainty the amount  at date t+1. The definition of consumption is then standardB it R
.c it ' θ
i
t&1 [pt % dt % μ] % B
i
t&1 R & θ
i
t pt & B
i
t
Equivalently, define wealth  and derive the familiar transition of wealthW it 'c
i
t %θ
i
tpt%B
i
t
(1a)     .W it%1' (W
i
t &c
i
t )R%θ
i
tQt%1 , Qt%1'pt%1% (dt%1%μ )&Rpt
 are excess returns. Given some initial values  the agent maximizes the expected utility Qt (θ
i
0 , W
i
0 )
(1b)    U ' E it
(θi , c i)
[
j
4
s ' 0
&β
t%s&1e
&( 1
τ
c it%s)
| Ht]
subject to a vector of state variables  and their transitions, all specified later.   consists of all past
ψ
i
t Ht
observable variables. We recognize the limitations of the exponential utility and use it as a good vehicle
to explain the main ideas, hence the term “illustrative” in this Section’s title. After deducing the closed
form solution of equilibrium risk premium we show how to generalize the key results.  
We now state an assumption and a conjecture. First, we assume the agent believes the payoff
{ } is conditionally normally distributed. Second, we conjecture that given the economy’sdt , t'1 ,2 ,...
state variables, equilibrium price  is also conditionally normal. In the next section we describe thept
state variables and the structure of belief and Theorem 2 confirms the conjecture. In Appendix B we
7show that for an optimum of (1a)-(1b), there is a constant vector  u so the stock demand function is
(2) .θit(pt) '
Rτ
r σˆ2Q
[ E it ( Qt%1) % uψ
i
t]
 is an adjusted conditional variance (see Appendix B for details) of excess stock returns which isσˆ2Q
assumed constant and the same for all agents. The term  is the intertemporal hedging demand whichuψit
is linear in agent i’s state variables. We have earlier assumed the dynamics of payoffs deduced from the
empirical frequencies is characterized by a first order Markov process with transition
(3)  .dt%1 ' λd dt % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 , σ
2
d )
Since the implied stationary probability is denoted by  m, we write .E m[dt%1 |dt] ' λd dt
Is the stationary model (3) the true data generating process?  Those who believe the economy is
stationary accept (3) as the truth. Such belief is rational since there is no empirical evidence against it.
However, since { } is non-stationary with unknown probability  Π, most agents do notdt, t'1,2,...
believe (3) is adequate to forecast the future. All surveys of forecasters show that subjective judgment
about the data contributes more than 50% to the final forecast (e.g. Batchelor and Dua (1991)). Hence,
agents form their own beliefs about dt+1 and other state variables explored later. With possibly complex
beliefs, how do we describe an equilibrium? For such a description do we really need to give a full,
detailed, development of the diverse theories of all agents? The structure of belief is our next topic.
1.2 Modeling Heterogeneity of belief  I: Individual Belief as a State Variable
The theory of Rational Beliefs due to Kurz (1994), (1997) defines an agent to be rational if his
model cannot be falsified by the data and if simulated, its simulated data reproduce the stationary
probability m deduced from the actual market data. The objective of this paper is the empirical test of
Theorem 3 stated below and for that we use only the most basic restrictions the theory of Rational
Beliefs imposes. Before explaining them we note that one of the theory’s aims is to account for the
evidence of persistent belief diversity. But this diversity raises a methodological question. In
formulating an asset pricing theory should we describe in detail the subjective models of each of the N
agents in the economy?  With wide diversity this is a formidable task. Also, if the objective is to study
dynamics of asset prices, is such a detailed description necessary? An examination of the subject reveals
that, although an intriguing question, such a detailed task is not needed. Instead, to describe an
equilibrium all we need is to specify how the beliefs of agents affect their subjectively perceived
8transition functions of state variables. Once specified, the Euler equations are fully defined and market
clearing leads to equilibrium pricing. We now explain this observation. 
In markets with heterogenous beliefs samples of individual forecasts are taken regularly and
their distributions become publicly available. We then make the realistic assumption that forecast
distributions are public observations over time. This fact points to the crucial difference between
markets with and without private information. A market with asymmetric private information is
secretive: agents do not reveal their forecasts since these provide real information about unobserved
state variables. Such revelation eliminates the small advantage that each agent has relative to others.
When an individual’s forecasts of a state variable are revealed in our market - without private
information - others do not view such forecasts as new information. They view them as an expression
of his opinion and consequently do not update their own beliefs about that state variable. Here a
forecaster uses the forecasts of state variables by other agents only to alter his forecasts of future
endogenous variables since we shall show that these depend upon future market belief. But then, how
do we describe the individual and market beliefs?
The key analytical step taken (see Nielsen (1996), Kurz (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001),
Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a),(2005b)) is to treat individual beliefs as primitive state variables,
reflecting the characteristics of the agents. Here we use the approach of Kurz, Jin and Motolese
(2005a), (2005b) as adapted and applied to the problem of this paper. We outline it now. 
An individual belief about an economy’s state variable is described with a personal state of
belief which uniquely pins down the transition function of the agent’s belief about next period’s
economy’s state variable. Hence, personal state variables and the economy-wide state variables are not
the same. A personal state of belief is like other state variables in the agent’s decision problem but is
analogous to the concept of an agent “type.” A personal state of belief at t identifies the agent type at
date t. However, at t he is not certain of his future belief types which are determined by a transition of
his personal state of belief. The distribution of individual states of belief, which is defined as “the
market state of belief,” is then an economy-wide observable state variable whose moments play an
important role. All moments could matter in equilibrium, but due to the exponential utility which we
use, equilibrium endogenous variables depend only on the mean market states of belief. This will be
generalized in the empirical work reported later. As noted, the crucial fact is that the market state of
belief is observable. In equilibrium, endogenous variables (e.g. prices) are functions of the economy’s
9state variables, including market state of belief. But in a large economy an agent’s “anonymity” implies
that a personal belief state has a negligible effect on prices and past personal states are not observed.
Finally, due to the effect of market belief on endogenous variables, an agent uses the equilibrium map to
forecast all endogenous variables and for that he forecasts future market belief. To forecast future
endogenous variables an agent must therefore forecast the beliefs of others. The main issue we need to
discuss next is the dynamics of individual beliefs and for this we turn to rationality restrictions. 
A direct implication of the Rational Belief principle says an individual belief cannot be a
constant transition unless an agent believes the stationary transition (3) is the truth. This is so since if
one holds a constant transition as his belief but not (3) then the time average of his belief is different
from (3). Since (3) is the time average in the data, this proves the agent is irrational. We then make the
key observation that rationality implies that beliefs must fluctuate and thus have inherent dynamics
which induces a crucial component of market volatility that we call “Endogenous Uncertainty.” 
Given the extensive evidence for persistent diverse beliefs which cannot be (3), one concludes
agents hold wrong beliefs. But being rational and “wrong” are not in conflict. Rational agents hold
wrong beliefs when there is no empirical proof they are wrong. Indeed, when agents use diverse models
when there is only one true law of motion, then most are wrong most of the time and market forecasts
are often wrong. The term “wrong” is used relative to an unknowable standard.  Market “mistakes”
deduced from rational behavior are then at the heart of our theory of market volatility. Since rationality
requires beliefs to reproduce the data and not deviate from it consistently, we use this rationality
restriction to require the belief index (presented next) to have an unconditional mean zero. 
 We now introduce agent i’s state of belief  . It describes his perception by pinning down hisg it
transition functions. Adding to “anonymity” we assume agent R  knows his own  and the marketg Rt
distribution of  at  t across i. In addition he observes past distributions of the  for all τ < t henceg it g
i
τ
he knows past values of all moments of the distributions of . We specify the dynamics of  by   g i
τ
g it
(4) g it%1 ' λZ g
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1 , ρ
ig
t%1 - N( 0 , σ
2
g )
where   are correlated across  i  reflecting correlation of beliefs across individuals. The concept ofρigt%1
an individual state of belief is central to our development and we consider (4) to be a primitive. It is
simply a positive description of type heterogeneity which can be justified in many ways. One compelling
reason for it is that it is supported by the data as shown later. Analytic justifications can also be
developed. For example, Kurz (2008) deduces (4) as a limit posterior of a Bayesian inference.
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How is  used by agent i? If denotes agent i’s perception of t+1 payoff then pins downg it d
i
t%1 g
i
t
his expectation  of the difference between his date t forecast of all state variables and theE it [d
i
t%1&λddt]
forecasts under the empirical distribution  m. Hence, agent i’s date t perceived distribution of isdt%1
(5)   .d it%1 ' λd dt % λ
g
dg
i
t % ρ
id
t%1 , ρ
id
t%1 - N(0 , σˆ
2
d )
The assumption that  is the same for all agents is made for simplicity. It follows that  measuresσˆ2d g
i
t
(6) .E i [d it%1 |Ht ,g
i
t ] & E
m [dt%1 |Ht ]' λ
g
dg
i
t
As explained before, restricting  to have a zero unconditional mean follows from the Rational Beliefg it
principle. But (6) also shows how to measure  in practice. For a state variable Xt,  data on i’sg
i
t
forecasts of  Xt+1  (in (5) it is  ) are measured by . One then uses standarddt%1 E
i [X it%1 |Ht ,g
i
t ]
econometric techniques to construct the stationary forecast used to compute (6). SuchE m [Xt%1 |Ht ]
construction and the data it generates are used by Fan (2006). An agent who believes the empirical
distribution is the truth is described by . He believes . Since a belief is aboutg it ' 0 dt%1-N(λd dt ,σ
2
d)
our changing society,  reflect belief about different economies. For example, in 1900 the  wereg it g
i
t
related to electricity and combustion engines, while in 2000 they reflected beliefs about information
technology. Hence, success or failure of past   tell you little about what present day  should be.g i
τ
g it
1.3 Modeling Heterogeneity of belief II: Individual and Market Beliefs
Averaging (4) denote by  the mean of the cross sectional distribution of  and we refer to itZt g
i
t
as “the average state of belief.” It is observable.  Due to correlation across agents, the law of large
numbers is not operative and the average of   over i does not vanish. We write it in the form  ρigt
(4b) .Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρ
Z
t%1
The true distribution of   is unknown. Correlation across agents exhibits non stationarity and thisρZt%1
property is inherited by the { Zt , t = 1, 2, ...} process. Since Zt are observable, market participants have
data on the joint process { } hence they know the joint empirical distribution of(dt , Zt) , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
these variables. For simplicity we assume that this distribution is described by the system of equations
    
(7a) dt%1 ' λd dt % ρ
d
t%1
(7b) Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρ
Z
t%1
ρ
d
t%1
ρ
Z
t%1
- N
0
0
,
σ
2
d, 0,
0, σ2Z
' Σ˜ , i.i.d.
Now, an agent who does not believe that (7a)-(7b) is the truth, formulates his own model\belief. We
have seen in (5) how agent  i’s belief state  pins down his forecast of  . We now broaden thisg it d
i
t%1
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idea to an agent’s perception model of the two state variables . Keeping in mind that before(d it%1 , Z
i
t%1 )
observing  agent i knows , his belief takes the general form(dt%1,Zt%1 ) dt and Zt
(8a) d it%1 ' λd dt % λ
g
d g
i
t % ρ
id
t%1
(8b)  Z it%1 ' λZ Zt % λ
g
Zg
i
t % ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
id
t%1
ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
ig
t%1
- N
0
0
0
,
σˆ
2
d , σˆZd , 0
σˆZd , σˆ
2
Z , 0
0 , 0 , σ2g
, ' Σi
(8c) g it%1 ' λZ g
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1
(8a)-(8b) show that, as required,  pins down the transition of both state variables . Thisg it (d
i
t%1 ,Z
i
t%1 )
simplicity ensures that one state variable pins down agent i’s subjective belief of how conditions at date
t are different from normal as reflected by the empirical distribution:
   E it
dt%1
Zt%1
& E mt
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
d g
i
t
λ
g
Z g
i
t
.
Note: in (8a)-(8c) the random term is not required to be  i.i.d. Also, we used the minimal restrictions
implied by rationality which we need for Theorem 3. Detailed rationality conditions, which imply the
average of  (8a)-(8c) yield (7a)-(7b) are not used explicitly here and are explained in Appendix A. 
Is belief heterogeneity central to (8a)-(8c)?  Given the exponential utility, only average market
belief matters so why could the model not be reduced to a representative agent? The answer is seen in
Equation (8b). A crucial element of the theory is that each agent forecasts future market belief and for
that an agent must perceive the market as different from himself. If an agent identifies himself with the
average market then there is nothing to forecast and (8b) is the same as (8c). Market heterogeneity also
reveals that the dynamics of   depends crucially upon the correlation across agents’ beliefs ratherZt
than on their beliefs. Since this correlation is not determined by individual rationality aggregate
dynamics is a consequence of heterogeneity and not of any individual rationality principle.
The average market expectation operator is defined by .  From (8c) it isE¯t (C ) '
1
Nj
N
i
E it (C )
   .    E¯t
dt%1
Zt%1
& E mt
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
d Zt
λ
g
Z Zt
Higher Order Beliefs. One must distinguish between higher order belief which are temporal and those
which are contemporaneous. Within our theory the system (8a)-(8c) defines agent i’s probability over 
sequences of and as is the case for any probability measure, it implies temporal higher order(dt , Zt , g
i
t )
beliefs of agent i with regard to future events. For example, we deduce from (8a)-(8c) statement like
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.E it (dt%N)'EtE
i
t%1 . . .E
i
t%N&1(dt%N) , E
i
t (Z
i
t%N)'Et E
i
t%1 . . .E
i
t%N&1( Z
i
t%N)
It is thus clear that temporal higher order beliefs are properties of conditional expectations. In addition,
by (8c) (or equivalently (4)) we have  . Hence we can also deduceE¯t (dt%N%1)'λdE¯t(dt%N)%λ
g
dE¯t (Zt%N)
perceived higher order market beliefs by averaging individual beliefs. For example, we have that
.E¯t (Zt%N) ' E¯t E¯t%N&1 (dt%N) & E¯tE
m
t%N&1 (dt%N)
The perception models (8a)-(8c) show that properties of conditional probabilities do not apply
to the market belief operator  since it is not a proper conditional expectation. To see why letE¯t(C )
 be a space where take values and Gi  be the space of . Since  i  conditions on , hisX'D×Z (dt , Zt) g
i
t g
i
t
unconditional probability is a measure on the space where öi is a sigma field. The(( D×Z×G i)4 ,öi)
market conditional belief operator is an average over conditional probabilities, each conditioned on a
different state variable. Hence, this averaging does not permit one to write a probability space for the
market belief. The market belief is neither a probability nor rational and we have the following result:
Theorem 1: The market belief operator violates iterated expectations: .E¯t (dt%2 ) … E¯t E¯t%1( dt%2 )
Proof:  Since     it follows that E it (dt%2 ) ' λdE
i
t ( dt%1 ) % λ
g
d E
i
t (g
i
t%1) ' λd [λd dt%λ
g
d g
i
t ] % λ
g
dλZg
i
t
(9) .E¯t (dt%2 ) ' λ
2
d dt%λ
g
d (λd % λZ) Zt
On the other hand we have from (8a) that   hence we have that  E¯t%1 ( dt%2 ) ' λd dt%1 % λ
g
d Zt%1
.E it E¯t%1 ( dt%2 ) ' λd [λd dt % λ
g
d g
i
t ] % λ
g
d [λZ Zt % λ
g
Zg
i
t ]
Aggregating now we conclude that
(10) .E¯t E¯t%1 (dt%2) ' λ
2
d dt % λ
g
d (λd % λZ % λ
g
Z ) Zt
Comparison of (9) and (10) shows that .  E¯t (dt%2 ) … E¯tE¯t%1 ( dt%2 )
Belief and information: understanding . For each agent,  is a state variable like others. NewsZt Zt
about  are used to forecast prices as GNP growth is used to assess recession risk. Market belief mayZt
be right or wrong and risk premia may rise or fall just because agents have more or less favorable views
about the future, not necessarily because there is data to convince investors the future is bright or bleak.
But then, how do they update beliefs given data on ? In contrast with private information, agents doZt
not revise their beliefs about the state variable : (8a) specifically does not depend upon . They dodt%1 Zt
not view  as information about  since it is not a “signal” about unobserved private informationZt dt%1
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they do not have. Indeed, they know all use the same public information.  However,  is crucial “news”Zt
about what the market thinks about  The importance of   is it’s value in forecasting endogenousdt%1! Zt
variables. Date t endogenous variables depend upon  and since market belief exhibits persistence,Zt
agents use today’s market belief to forecast future endogenous variables. How is this equilibriated?
1.4 Combining the Elements: the Implied Asset Pricing Under Diverse Beliefs
We now derive equilibrium prices and the risk premium. For details see Appendix B where we
also explain the term , which is the “adjusted” conditional variance of . We have also explainedσˆ2Q Qt%1
in 1.3 why the state variables in (2) are specified by the vector . Hence, rewrite (2) asψit ' (1 , dt ,Zt ,g
i
t )
(11) .θit(pt) '
Rτ
r σˆ2Q
[ E it ( Qt%1) % uψ
i
t] , u' ( u0 , u1 , u2 , u3 ) , ψ
i
t ' ( 1 , dt , Zt ,g
i
t )
For an equilibrium to exist we need some stability conditions. First we require the interest rate r to be
positive,  R = 1 + r > 1 so that   . Now we add:0 < 1
R
< 1
(12) Stability Conditions: We require that     . 0 < λd < 1 , λZ < 1 , 0 < λZ % λ
g
Z < 1
The first requires {dt , t = 1, 2, ...}  to be stable and have an empirical distribution. The second is a
stability of belief condition. It requires i to believe  is stable. To see why, take expectations of(dt , Zt)
(8b), average over the population and recall that  Zt  are market averages of the . This implies that g
i
t
(13) .E¯t [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ % λ
g
Z )Zt
Theorem 2: Consider the model with heterogenous beliefs under the stability conditions specified with
supply of shares which equals N. Then there is a unique equilibrium price function which takes the form 
 .pt ' ad dt % aZ Zt % P0
Proof:  Average (11), use the fact that the aggregate stock supply is N and rearrange to have
(14)   .
r σˆ2Q
Rτ
' [ E¯t(pt%1%dt%1%μ ) & Rpt % (u0%u1dt% (u2%u3)Zt) ]
Now use the perception models (8a)-(8b) about the state variables, average them over the population
and use the definition of  Zt  to deduce the following relationships which are the key implications of
treating individual and market beliefs as state variables
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(15a) E¯t(dt%1 % μ ) ' λddt % μ % λ
g
d Zt
(15b) E¯t [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ%λ
g
Z)Zt
Using these to solve for date t price we deduce
(16) pt '
1
R
[ E¯t(pt%1 )] %
1
R
[ (λd % u1)dt % (λ
g
d % u2 % u3)Zt] %
1
R
[μ % u0] &
rσˆ2Q
R 2τ
(16) shows that equilibrium price is the solution of a linear difference equation  in the two state
variables  . Hence,  a standard argument (see Blanchard and Kahn(1980), Proposition 1, page(dt , Zt)
1308) shows that the solution is 
 (17a) pt ' ad dt % aZ Zt % P0
To match coefficients use (17a) to insert (15a) - (15b) into (16) and conclude that
 (17b)  . ad '
λd % u1
R & λd
 (17c)  aZ '
( ad % 1)λ
g
d % ( u2 % u3 )
R& (λZ%λ
g
Z )
 (17d) .P0 '
(μ % u0)
r
&
σˆ
2
Q
Rτ
The stability conditions ensure that  (17a) -  (17d) is the unique solution as asserted.  
Since we do not have a closed form solution for the hedging demand parameters  weu' (u0 ,u1 ,u2 ,u3 )
computed numerical Monte Carlo solutions. For all values of the model parameters given the interesting
case  we find  and . These are reasonable conclusions:   increases with(λgd>0,λ
g
Z>0) ad >0 aZ >0 pt
higher  and with higher - today’s market belief in unusually higher future dividends.d t Zt
1.5 Equilibrium Risk Premium Under Heterogenous Beliefs
1.5.1 The Main Equilibrium Results
Under heterogenous beliefs we have diverse concepts of risk premia and one chooses a concept
which is appropriate for an application. The risk premium on a long position, as a random variable, is
(18)         .
πt%1 '
pt%1 % dt%1 % μ & Rpt
pt
(18) is a random variable measuring actual excess returns of stocks over the riskless bond. The need is
to measure the premium as a known expected quantity, recognized by participants. We have three such
measures. The first is the subjective expected excess returns by agent i, computed by using the
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equilibrium map (17a) and the perception model (8a) -(8c) to show that
(19)
1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%μ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(ad%1)(λd dt%λ
g
dg
i
t )%aZ(λZZt%λ
g
Zg
i
t )%μ%P0&Rpt]
Aggregating over i, the market premium is the average market expected excess returns. This perceived
premium reflects what the market expects, not what it receives. From (19) it is measured by
(20) 1
pt
E¯t(pt%1 % dt%1 % μ & Rpt ) ' '
1
pt
[(ad%1)(λddt%λ
g
d Zt) % aZ(λZZt % λ
g
ZZt)%μ %P0&Rpt]
Neither (19)  nor (20) are objective risk premia. We thus turn to an objective measure, common to all
agents, computed by agents studying the long term time variability of the premium and measuring it by
the empirical distribution of (18). Using (17a) and the stationary transition (7a)-(7b) we have
(21) E mt [πt%1] '
1
pt
E mt [pt%1%dt%1%μ &Rpt] '
1
pt
[( ad%1)(λddt)%aZ (λZ )Zt %μ %P0&Rpt]
Observe that (21) is the way Econometricians and all researchers cited above have measured the risk
premium. For this reason we refer to it as “the” risk premium. 
We arrive at two conclusions. First, the differences between the premia in (19) and (20) is
(22a) .1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%μ&Rpt) &
1
pt
E¯t( pt%1%dt%1%μ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d% aZλ
g
Z] ( g
i
t & Zt )
This says that from the perspective of trading, all that matters is the difference  of individualg it & Zt
from market belief.  Also, the risk premium is different from the market perceived premium when Z …0.
(22b) .
1
pt
E mt (pt%1%dt%1%μ&Rpt) &
1
pt
E¯t( pt%1%dt%1%μ&Rpt) ' &
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d% aZλ
g
Z] Zt
The more important conclusion is derived by combining (20) with (22b). By (17c) we have
, hence we can deduce the main result:&(u2%u3)'&aZ( R&λZ)% [(ad%1)λ
g
d%aZλ
g
Z]
 
Theorem 3:  The equilibrium risk premium has the following analytical expression
(23a)
1
pt
E mt (pt%1%dt%1%μ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(
r σˆ2Q
Rτ
& u0 & u1dt) & aZ (R & λZ) Zt]
Since az > 0,   R > 1 and  it follows thatλZ < 1
(23b) the Risk Premium   is decreasing in the mean market belief   .E mt [πt%1] Zt
Conclusions (23a) -(23b) are central to this paper.  (23a) and the earlier results exhibit the Endogenous
Uncertainty component of the risk premium which we call “The Market Belief Risk Premium.” It shows
that market belief has a complex effect on market risk premia. The effect of belief consist of two parts
(I) The first is the direct effect of market beliefs on the permanent mean premium . It is
r σˆ2Q
Rτ
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shown in the Appendix that there exist weights  such that (ω1 ,ω12,ω2 )
      .σˆ2Q ' Var
i
t ((ω1(λddt % λ
g
d g
i
t %ω12ρ
id
t%1)%ω2 (λZ Zt%λ
g
Zg
i
t %ω12ρ
iZ
t%1 ))
Volatility of individual and market belief, which we call “Endogenous Uncertainty” contributes
directly to the volatility of excess returns and increases permanently the risk premium.
(II)  The second is the effect of market belief on the time variability of the risk premium,
reflected in    with a negative sign when Zt > 0.& aZ (R & λZ) Zt
To explain this second result we note that it says that if one runs a regression of excess returns on the
observable variables, the effect of the market belief on long term excess return is negative. This sign is
surprising since when Zt > 0 the market expects above normal future dividends but in that case the risk
premium on the stock is lower. When Zt < 0 the market holds bearish belief about future dividend but
the risk premium is higher. Since we have data on Zt and on the distribution of belief the result will be
empirically tested. Before proceeding to the empirical test we discuss some ramifications of this result. 
1.5.2 The Market Belief Risk Premium is Fully General
The main result (23b) was derived from the assumed exponential utility function. We argue that
this result is more general and depends only on the positive coefficient  az  of  in the price map. ToZt
show this, assume any additive utility function over consumption and a risky asset which pays a
“dividend” or any other random payoff . Denote the price map by . We are interesteddt pt ' Φ( dt , Zt )
in the slope of the excess return function  with respect to . Focusing only on the numeratorE mt [πt%1] Zt
, linearize the price around  0 and write . TheE mt [ pt%1 % dt%1 % μ & Rpt] pt ' Φddt % ΦZZt %Φ0
desired result depends only upon the condition . It is reasonable as it requires current price to
ΦZ > 0
increases if the market is more optimistic about the asset’s future payoffs. To prove the point note that 
 E mt [ pt%1% (dt%1%μ)&Rpt] . E
m
t [Φddt%1%ΦZZt%1%Φ0% (dt%1%μ)&R(Φddt%ΦZZt%Φ0 )]
      .' [(Φd%1)λd & RΦd]dt&ΦZ(R & λZ)Zt% [μ%Φ0 ( 1&R)]
The desired result follows from the fact that ,  R > 1 and . 
ΦZ > 0 λZ < 1
The price map might be more complicated. If we write it as  where X arept ' Φ( dt , Zt , Xt )
other state variables (in particular, the distribution of wealth), the analysis is more complicated since we
need to specify a complete model for forecasting  but the main result continues to hold.Xt%1
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1.5.3 Interpretation of the Market Belief Risk Premium
Why is the effect of  Zt on the risk premium negative? Since this result is general and applicable
to any asset with risky payoffs, we offer a general interpretation. Our result shows that when the market
holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset the market views the long position as
less risky and consequently the risk premium on the long position of the asset falls. Fluctuating market
belief implies time variability of risk premia but more specifically, in the long run fluctuations in risk
premia are inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs.
To explore the result, it is important to explain what it does not say. One could interpret it to
confirm a common claim that to maximize excess returns it is optimal to be a “contrarian” to the market
consensus. To understand why this is a false interpretation note that when an agent holds a belief
about future dividends, the market belief  Zt  does not offer him new information to alter his belief
about dividends. If the agent believes future dividends will be abnormally high but , the agentZt < 0
does not change his forecast of . He uses Zt only to forecast future prices. Hence, Zt is a crucialdt%1
input to forecasting returns without changing the forecast of . Since given the available informationdt%1
and his probability belief, which is, say,  an optimizing agent is already on his demand function. HeΓi
does not just abandon his demand by replacing  with the empirical measure m. This argument isΓi
analogous to the one showing why it is not optimal to adopt the log utility as your utility even though it
maximizes the growth rate of your wealth. Yes, it does that, but you dislike the sharp declines which
you expect to occur in the value of your assets if you follow the strategy called for by the log utility. By
analogy, following a “contrarian” policy implies a high long run average return in accord with  m  since
this is what (23a) says. But if your subjective model disagrees with the probability m  you will dislike
being short when your optimal position should be long. This argument explains why most people do not
systematically bet against the market, as a “contrarian” strategy (23a) would dictate. 
Taking a positive view, our results show that fluctuations in market belief are crucial for the
time variability of the risk premium and the market pricing of risk. Market optimism in bull markets or
pessimism in bear markets have drastic effects on market risk perception. A bull market is a market in
which risk perception is low and a bear market is one in which risk perception is high. Our result (23a)
shows that on average, market optimism induces lower risk premium and market pessimism generate
high risk premium. But due to diverse beliefs the individually perceived premia are diverse. To see this
use (19) and (21) to show that perceived premia are  . Hence,E it (πt%1)'E
m
t (πt%1)%
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d%λ
g
Z]g
i
t
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optimizing agents take into account information about   in calculating their premia. From theirZt
perspective the state variable  is used to assess risk in the same way as NFP is used to assess the riskZt
of recessions and hence the market risk premium. We turn now to an empirical test of our theory. 
2. Testing of the Endogenous Time Variability of the Risk Premium: The Data
2.1 The Forecast Data
We use data on the distribution of commercial forecasts and take them as proxies for forecasts
made by the general public. The data is circulated monthly by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts
(BLUF). It provides forecasts of over 50 economists at major corporations and financial institutions.
The number of forecasters may vary from month to month and, due to mergers and other
organizational changes, the list of potential forecasters also changes over time. A sample of
forecasters includes Moody's Investors Service, Prudential Securities, Inc. Ford Motor Company,
Macroeconomic Advisers LLC, Goldman Sachs & Co., DuPont, J. P. Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch,
Fannie Mae, and others.  BLUF reports forecasts of  U.S. interest rates at all maturities along with
forecasts of GDP growth and inflation. Forecasts reported in BLUF are collected on the 24th and 25th
of each month and released to subscribers on the first day of the following month.
The BLUF publishes, for each variable, individual and mean (“consensus”) forecasts. The
mean is taken over all forecasters participating in that month. Forecasts are made for several quarters
into the future. For each horizon forecasters are asked to forecast the average value of that variable
during the future quarter in question. Note, the realized value of any variable for the quarter in which
forecasts are released is not known at forecasting time since such data is available only after the
quarter ends. As a result, each set of forecasts includes “current quarter” forecast which is denoted by
the horizon  h = 0. Hence,  h = 1 means “the quarter following the quarter in which the forecasts were
made.”  The BLUF publication was initiated in 1983:01 and circulated forecast data with horizons of
h = 0,1,...,4 quarters. The initial version of the files provided data for the Fed Fund rate, 1-month
Commercial Paper rate, 3-month T-Bill rate, 30-year Treasury Bonds rate, AAA long term corporate
bonds rate, growth rates of GNP, changes in the GNP deflator and CPI. In 1988:01 the BLUF added 
individual and market mean forecasts to complete the yield curve on treasury securities covering also
maturities of  6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years and 10 years. In 1992:01 forecasts of GNP and GNP
deflator were replaced by forecasts of GDP and GDP deflator. In 1997:01 the forecast horizon was
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expanded by one quarter and from that date h = 0,1,...,5 quarters. Hence, a uniform panel data set for
the term structure of interest rates is available starting in 1988:01. The data set has undergone other
minor changes since its first release. These are not relevant to this paper and are not reported here.
In the empirical work we use a month as a unit of time. Hence, we had to translate quarterly
mean forecasts to monthly forecasts. This was accomplished by an interpolation which selected for
each t and for each variable the B-form of a least squares cubic spline piecewise polynomial which 
minimized the squared deviations from the given forecasts. When a variable is recorded monthly then
all forecasters actually know at each date the realized monthly variable at hand for those months of
the present quarter which have already past. This clearly applies to all interest rate data. Hence, it was
useful to include in all interpolations past realized data of the variable in question for one quarter
before date t (hence, three monthly observations). This procedure improves continuity at date t. An
optimal polynomial is computed for each date and utilizes no future market data of any kind. At the
end of the interpolation we have monthly data with monthly forecast horizons h=1,2,...,12.
The forecasts reported in BLUF are labeled by their release date, which is the start of each
month. Hence, these forecasts are conditional on information available at the moment the forecasts
were collected which is the end of the month previous to release. For example, data released  in
1988:01 is  recorded in our “sample period” as 1987:12 since the data released on January 1, 1988 is
based on information available to forecasters at a date identified by us as 1987:12. Therefore all dates
in this paper should be considered as identified with the end of the month. The data set has been
updated in a format suitable for computations up to 2003:11.
2.2 Extracting Market States of Belief
The concepts of individual and market states of belief are central to the empirical work and we
now explain how they are constructed. For any variable X denote by  agent i’s conditionalE it {Xt%h}
forecast of  at date t and by  the forecast under the stationary probability m. Agent i’sXt%h E
m
t {Xt%h}
state of belief about  is then defined byXt%h
  .Z(X,h,i)t ' E
i
t {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}
This expression removes from  the effect of other state variables. Since is the deviationZ(X,h,i)t Z
(X,h,i)
t
from the stationary forecast, it must be interpreted properly. Thus, suppose  y is growth rate of GDP.
When  the agent is “optimistic” about future growth but it does not mean he believesZ(y,h ,i)t > 0
3  The data is publically available on Watson’s web page   http://www.princeton.edu/~mwatson/publi.html  
20
output will necessarily go up. He does believe output will grow faster than “normal,” defined by the
growth rate expected under  m. The market state of belief is defined by 
 Z(X,h)t '
1
N j
N
i'1
[ E it {Xt%h} & E
m
t {Xt%h} ] ' E¯t{Xt%h} & E
m
t {Xt%h}
and the cross sectional variance of beliefs is
(σt
(X,h))2'
1
Nj
N
i'1
[E it {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}]& [E¯t {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}]
2
'
1
Nj
N
i'1
E it {Xt%h}& E¯t {Xt%h}
2
.
Since is the mean forecast, reflects the market’s views about economic conditionsE¯t{Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
which are different at t from what is expected under  m. These differences are the reason why the
market forecasts and not . “Optimism” or “pessimism” depend upon the context.E¯t{Xt%h} E
m
t {Xt%h}
For example,  means the market is optimistic about abnormally high output growth in  t+h.Z(y,h)t > 0
If  is  j maturity  interest rate, then  means the market expects this rate to be higher thanR(j) Z(j ,h)t > 0
normal at t+h. The market belief about Fed Funds rates is a belief about future monetary policy.
Hence,  means the market expects an abnormally tight monetary policy. Note that in thisZ(F,h)t > 0
paper, all belief variables are about future interest rates. 
To measure we need data on the two components which define it. BLUF files provideZ(X,h)t
direct data on  and as discussed. We have monthly forecast data on interest rates atE it {Xt%h} E¯t{Xt%h}
different maturities, GDP growth , change in the CPI and the GDP deflator. The key issue is thus the
construction of the stationary forecasts . These forecasts are made with a model that takesE mt {Xt%h}
into account all data that was available at date t hence we take into account the release date of each
variable used in the following analysis. A feature of stationarity is time invariance, implying the model
is valid out of sample. This is an idealization which we can only approximate, given the relatively
limited data set which we have.  We thus compute employing the Stock and Watson’sE mt {Xt%h}
(1999), (2001), (2002), (2005) method of diffusion indices. We briefly explain this procedure.
We started with the Stock & Watson’s data set3 developed by Data Resources and Global
Insight. It contains 215 monthly U.S. time series from 1959:01 to 2003:12, covering the main
economic sectors. As discussed in Stock and Watson (2005), the series are transformed by taking
logarithms and/or by differencing. First differences of logarithms (growth rates) are used for real
quantity variables, first differences are used for nominal interest rates, and second differences of
logarithms (changes in growth rates) for price series. Because of missing data we use (see Stock and
21
Watson (2005)) only 127 series from 1959:01 to 2003:12. These represent ten main categories of
variables: consumption, employment, exchange rates, housing starts, interest rates, money aggregates,
prices, real output, stock prices and the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations.
Stacking them, we obtain an information matrix of dimension 540 by 127. One of Stock and Watson’s
(1999) conclusion is that effective time invariant models need to employ a small number of variables.
The reason for this observation is that linear forecasting models with a large number of variables are
unstable and forecast poorly out of sample. The Stock-Watson method reduces the rank of the matrix
but keeps as much information as possible by creating diffusion indices constructed via principal
component analysis to extract factors that best explain the variance of the information matrix. 
For the period at hand the five greatest factors explain 43% of the variation in the information
matrix and with twenty factors the variance explained is 74%. However, the marginal contribution of
a factor declines rapidly implying that little marginal explanatory power is gained when using more
than a few factors. Indeed, since we study interest rates which are rather persistent, nothing in this
paper is changed by using more than four factors in the stationary forecasting scheme we adopt
below. Stock and Watson (2002) concluded that a combination of factors and lags of the forecasted
variable is the best information set. For any variable X the objective is to compute forecasts of
using information at time t. In all regressions of Section 3 we need stationary forecasts of marketXt%h
nominal interest rates and for these variables the forecasts are constructed as follows: 
(i) let  denote the stationary h-period change in a nominal interest rate and  for
ΔxT%h'XT%h&XT F
i
T
 denote the first four factors deduced from date T information matrix;i'1,..., 4
(ii) estimate the parameters by the following OLS regression:αˆh, βˆ
h,i
, γˆh
     ;ΔxT%h ' α
h
%
j
4
i ' 1
β
h,iF iT % γ
h
ΔxT % gT%h, for T ' 1,...,t&h
(iii) the forecasts of at date t are then given by:
Δˆxt%h
 .Δˆxt%h,t ' αˆ
h
%
j
4
i ' 1
βˆ
h,i
F it % γˆ
h
Δxt
Finally, the stationary forecasts of the interest rates are . A similar procedureE mt {Xt%h} ' Xt % Δˆxt%h,t
is used for the GDP deflator except that .ΔxT%h'XT%h
Real Time vs. A Single Estimate. Had our data set been very long, the stationary forecast
 could be constructed from any long time interval and it would be time invariant. Since ourE mt {Xt%h}
data set is short and we study excess returns, we decided not to use the factor loadings of a single
model estimated for the entire period 1959:01 to 2003:12 combined. Instead, all our estimates of
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 and are made by using real time forecasts. For each date in the sample we thus useE mt {Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
data from 1959:01 up to the given date in order to recompute the factor loadings, reestimate a
stationary model with which we compute  and then deduce the values of .E mt {Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
Table 1A: Summary Statistics of Market Beliefs
h = 6 Months or 2 Quarters  Ahead Time Average Standard Deviation Autocorrelation
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 0.273
 0.238
 0.365
0.528
0.429
0.595
0.700
0.735
0.674
h = 12 Months  or 4 Quarters Ahead
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 0.267
 0.385
 0.398
0.763
0.681
0.798
0.632
0.841
0.740
Tables 1A and 1B provide some summary statistics of a sample of extracted market belief
variables  .  The last column in Table 1A reports the first order autocorrelation parameter.Z(X,h)t
Although theory requires each market belief to have a long term time average equal to zero, it is clear
the means over short time periods are not zero. Indeed, the fact that the belief indices for inflation and
nominal interest rates have positive time averages for the period at hand is significant. It reflects the
forecasting bias in the US during that era when beliefs in inflation and doubts about the efficacy of
monetary policy persisted (see Kurz (2005)) despite the mounting evidence against these beliefs. Note
also the autocorrelation coefficients which are compatible with the Markov dynamics of belief in (4).
Table 1B: Correlation Matrix of  Market Beliefs
6 Months or 2 Quarters Ahead Fed Fund rate 1 year T-bill rate GDP deflator 
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 1.000
 0.850
 0.363
 1.000
 0.298  1.000
12 Months or 4 Quarters Ahead
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
GDP deflator 
 1.000
 0.856
 0.516
 1.000
 0.523  1.000
To illustrate, Figure 1 traces the graph of  for the 6-months T-bill rate with horizons Z(6 ,h)t
h = 4, 12. The figure shows the belief indexes exhibit large fluctuations ranging from -1.5% to +2.5%.
which are very significant from the economic point of view.  In Figure 2 we trace the time variability
of the cross-sectional standard deviations of the  across i, for horizons h = 4, 12. It isσt
(6 ,h) Z(6 ,h ,i)t
clear from the figure that the dispersion of beliefs increases with the forecasting horizon. This is a
common feature of all data on belief distributions.
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2.3 Data on Realized Market Interest Rates, Rates of Return and Excess Returns
Treasury Bills market.  Theory suggests we work with interest rates implied by zero coupon
bond prices hence we used data on zero coupon securities with maturities of 1 to 18 months, based
Figure 2: 6-month Treasury Bill rate: 4 and 12(dashed line) month ahead standard deviation of Market Belief  Z (6)t
Figure 1: 6-month Treasury Bill rate: 4 and 12(dashed line) month ahead Market Belief Z (6)t
4 Traders are required to put up good faith security deposit which is a margin collateral to ensure they honor their
pledge for the deposit as agreed. The collateral securities are owned by the parties to the contract who continue to benefit from
any return to their investments. Margin cash is often held in the form of T Bills which yield interest to the owner. Hence a
buyer or seller of a futures contract do not have any investment or opportunity cost except for the risk they take on the actual
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on the Fama-Bliss file (see Fama and Bliss (1987)). The data up to 2003:11 was generated by a
FORTRAN routines (provided by R.R. Bliss), using a method developed by Bliss for the unsmoothed
Fama-Bliss data set (see Bliss (1997)). Let  be the one period excess holding returns of T Billsπ(j,h)t%h
with (j + h) maturity held for  h periods and sold at maturity  j. It can be measured as a monthly or an
annualized rate since all we say here about T Bills is independent of the unit of time selected. We
study the h - month excess holding returns defined by
hπ(j,h)t%h ' (j%h)R
(j%h)
t & jR
(j)
t%h & hR
(h)
t
where is the one period interest rate implied by a zero coupon bond with maturity at τ. We studyR (τ)t
the two maturities j = 3 and 6 months. All data on the right hand side of the expression are then
available in the Fama-Bliss file described above. The limiting factor in the study of this market is the
BLUF data hence the period of analysis is 1987:12- 2003:11.
It is useful to clarify the trading mechanics needed to realize h period holding returns earned
by selling a specified debt τ dates in the future. For example, to sell a six month Treasury Bill 12
month from now one must buy a Treasury Bond with maturity of 18 months and sell it 12 month from
now. Returns on this long position consist of interest earned plus capital gains or losses realized.
Federal Fund Futures market. The second set of markets are for non contingent Federal
Funds futures contracts with diverse monthly settlement horizons. A Fed Funds futures contract
enables buyers and sellers to trade the risk of the Fed Funds rate that would prevail at the time of
settlement. Hence this is the risk of the future target of the Fed Fund rate that would be fixed by the
Fed’s FOMC. Fed funds futures have traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) since October
1988 and settle based on the mean Fed fund rate that prevails over a specified calendar month. The
mean is computed as a simple average of the daily averages published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. Hence, a trader needs to forecast the average federal fund rate during the contract month.
The contract horizon is the number of months prior to the settlement date when a trader commits to
go long or short such a contract. Contracts are settled by cash by the end of the contract month. Keep
in mind that traders of such contracts do not invest capital and do not incur any opportunity cost4;
Fed Funds rate that would prevail at settlement. In this sense this market permits agents to trade risk of future monetary policy
actions.  
5 The CBOT uses the 360 day year as the basic convention for quotation of interest rate and conversion from annual
to monthly rates. The CBOT provides more details on its web page.
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they commit at t to a contract rate which becomes the contract cost basis at settlement, h F (h)t
months later.  h = 3 means a three-month-ahead  contract horizon. Data on are then recorded byF (h)t
the exchange and become public information. Some missing observations arise if a contract is not
traded. Let us now explain the risks and rewards of a trader in this market.
The trader with a long position (the “buyer”) of a Fed Funds futures contract owns a contract
under which an interest rate of is paid on a $5 million deposit for a month during month t + h.F (h)t
is quoted as an annual rate. Denote by  the actual average annualized Fed Funds rate duringF (h)t R
(F)
t%h
settlement month, h  months later. Let  n  be the number of days in the contract month then at
settlement a seller pays and a buyer receives for each contract the cash amount5 
.$Profits ' [ F (h)t & R
(F)
t%h]×
n
360
×$5,000,000
It is then clear the parties trade the risk of  which is the risk of the rate set by the Open MarketR (F)t%h
Committee. It is reasonable to define the excess return of any gamble in this market to be defined by 
π
(F,h)
t%h ' F
(h)
t & R
(F)
t%h
Data on   is recorded by CBOT while data on  is reported by the Federal Reserve. Given theF (h)t R
(F)
t%h
data set available the period for analysis of this market is 1988:10- 2003:11.
The problem of serial correlation.  Serial correlation in forecast errors is inevitable for well known
reasons. Computing excess returns utilizes overlapping data and this fact leads us to report in work
below robust standard errors of estimates. We compute standard errors using the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation (HAC) procedure for robust estimates developed by Hodrick (1992), which
generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) method. This correction places full weight on the lags of
serial correlation in excess returns. We thus compute HAC robust standard errors with h-1 lags.
3. Analysis of the Risk Premium in the Bond and Federal Fund Futures Markets
We turn to an empirical test of the validity of the theoretical conclusions (23a)-(23b) about
the effect of market belief on the time variability of risk premia. We do that by studying excess
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holding returns on three and six month Treasury Bills with holding periods from 1 to 12 months, and
Federal Funds Futures contracts with holding periods of 1 to 6 months. We note that it may appear
that our use of forecast data of interest rates is incompatible with the theory where agents forecast
. The procedure we use is valid since extracting a belief index from exogenous payoff(dt%h,Zt%h)
variables is the same as extracting it from prices. This is seen from the fact that by (17a)
Ept%h&E
mpt%h'ad(Edt%h&E
mdt%h)%aZ(EZt%h&E
mZt%h)'(adλ
g
d%aZλ
g
Z)Zt.
We thus extract, in this paper, the primitive market belief from forecasts of interest rates.
3.1 Estimating Risk Premium Functions
For any asset X we estimate linear excess return functions of the following general form
(24)  π(X,h)t%h 'α
(X,h)
0 %α
(X,h)
1 Mt%α
(X,h)
2 Yt%ε
(X,h)
t%h
where  is a vector of macroeconomic variables and  is a vector of market belief variables to beMt Yt
specified. The use of ordinary regression is appropriate since the belief variables are primitives not
expressed in the economic variables in . Mt
To specify  and  note that under an exponential utility the risk premium is a function ofYt Mt
mean market belief only; no other moments matter. For more general utility functions the entire
distribution matters and we thus take into account the second moments of this distribution. To that end
we study below the first two moments of the distribution of individual beliefs. about any asset X:
 –  date t  mean market belief about X at future date t+h&Z (X,h)t
    –  date t cross sectional standard deviations of individual beliefs about X at future date t+h. σ(X,h)t
Note the negative sign in . It results from our convention to describe belief as in (8a)-(8c).&Z (X,h)t
Belief variables are oriented so that a positive belief is perceived beneficial to a long position. Since a
belief in a higher future interest rate is a belief in a lower future price of debt, a belief which is
beneficial to a long position in debt is a belief in lower rather than higher interest rates. 
The macroeconomic variables in  reflect the standard literature on excess return on debtMt
instruments and futures markets as noted in the introductory section. First, following Piazzesi and
Swanson (2004) who concentrated on the cyclical variable, we use the following three macroeconomic
variables in estimating risk premium in the Federal Funds futures market:
 - lagged year over year growth rate of Non Farm Payroll;NFPt&1
 - lagged year over year change in the consumer price index ;CPIt&1
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Ft  -   the Federal Funds rate, reflecting the state of monetary policy at t.
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) stressed the predictive power of past yields. To reflect their results we
use yield variables to assess the risk premium in markets for 3 month and 6 month Treasury Bills. We
introduce data on yields of Treasuries with 18 maturities covering 1970:01 to 2003:11. To reduce the
dimension of information we computed principal components in real time (i.e.  employ data up to t)
and in all estimates we use the first three factors with notation , υ =1,2,3. These three factorsR Fυt
account for 98% of the total variance of the yields’ information matrix. 
In sum, variables in  are those economic variables reported in the literature to affect the riskMt
premium. We take these results as given and add to them the effect of belief variables  which areYt
constructed to be nearly m-orthogonal to and which thus add information not in .   Mt Mt
Comments on the time unit are useful. Rates of return on holding T Bills are naturally annual
rates and hence comparable across different T Bills and horizons. This is not the case of Fed Funds
futures. Total returns on such futures are measured in percentage points for the length of time the
contracts are held consequently they are not annualized. Returns on short duration contracts are
typically smaller than returns on long duration contracts hence excess returns on holding Fed Funds
futures are not entirely comparable with returns on holding an asset with clearly defined holding cost. 
This lack of comparability should be kept in mind in any cross-table comparisons. Tables 2A-
2C present parameter estimates of (24) for the three markets. We report estimates for the shortest, the
longest and intermediate horizons. 
Table 2A:  Federal Fund Futures Market
Note: regressions  to explain 1 month to 6 months Excess Returns in the Federal Fundπ(F,h)t%h 'α
(F,h)
0 %α
(F,h)
1 Mt%α
(F,h)
2 Yt%ε
(F,h)
t%h
Futures Market.  is a vector of macroeconomic variables and  is a vector of belief variables as explained in the text. TheMt Yt
table reports 3 out of  the 6 regressions computed. * and † denote significance  respectively at the 10%  and  5%  level. All R 2
are adjusted for degrees of freedom and HAC robust standard errors computed with h-1 lags are reported in parenthesis. The
sample contains 182 monthly observations from 1988:10 to 2003:11. The Chow Test has been computed by splitting the
sample in two sub-samples of 91 observations each (see Section 3.2 for further explanations).
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft σ
(F,h)
t &Z
(F,h)
t R
2
Chow
Test
p-value
h=1  0.011
(0.025)
 0.012 
(0.009)
 0.005
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.008)
 0.010
(0.141)
-0.234 †
(0.047)
0.237  0.351
h=3 -0.015
(0.081)
-0.079 †
(0.034)
-0.003 
(0.037)
 0.060 †
(0.028)
-0.543
(0.352)
-0.321 †
(0.056)
0.311 0.000
h=6 -0.199
(0.136)
-0.284 †
(0.047)
-0.056
(0.085)
 0.233 †
(0.042)
-0.413 
(0.455)
-0.397 †
(0.130)
0.407 0.000
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Table 2B: 3 Months Treasury Bills Market
Note: regressions  to explain 1 month to 12 months Excess Returns in the 3 Months T-Bills Market specified in anπ(3,h)t%h 'α
(3,h)
0 %α
(3,h)
1 Mt%α
(3,h)
2 Yt%ε
(3,h)
t%h
analogous manner to the information in Table 2A. The table reports 6 out of  the 12 regressions computed. The sample contains 192 monthly observations from
1987:12 to 2003:11.
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(3,h)
t &Z
(3,h)
t R
2 ChowTest
p-value
h=1 -0.905 
(0.736)
 0.084 †
(0.036)
 0.023
(0.048)
 0.142
(0.098)
-0.542 * 
(0.325)
-0.321 †
(0.076)
 0.075
(0.058)
-0.238
(0.702)
-1.636 †
(0.165)
0.482  0.026
h=3  0.786 *
(0.463)
-0.100 †
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.034)
 0.032
(0.065)
 0.243 
(0.221)
-0.147 †
(0.055)
-0.061
(0.046)
-0.997 †
(0.381)
-0.729 †
(0.104)
0.450 0.116
h=5  1.147 †
(0.571)
-0.176 †
(0.024)
-0.015 
(0.046)
-0.013
(0.088)
 0.517 *
(0.272)
 0.019
(0.061)
-0.045 
(0.051)
-0.388 
(0.245)
-0.345 †
(0.081)
0.391 0.110
h=7  1.620 †
(0.592)
-0.204 †
(0.026)
-0.001 
(0.040)
-0.073
(0.080)
 0.734 †
(0.271)
 0.012
(0.054)
-0.033
(0.047)
-0.171 
(0.214)
-0.198 †
(0.060)
0.466 0.008
h=9  2.076 †
(0.437)
-0.160 †
(0.023)
 0.006 
(0.029)
-0.125
(0.052)
 0.974 †
(0.192)
-0.003
(0.046)
-0.015
(0.045)
-0.330 
(0.203)
-0.306 †
(0.049)
0.607 0.005
h=12  1.684 †
(0.593)
-0.200 †
(0.021)
 0.004 
(0.026)
-0.029
(0.079)
 0.749 †
(0.295)
-0.068
(0.038)
-0.012
(0.026)
-0.403 †
(0.097)
-0.180 †
(0.027)
0.673 0.434
Table 2C: 6 Months Treasury Bills Market
Note: regressions  to explain 1 month to 12 months Excess Returns in the 6 Months T-Bills Market specified in anπ(6,h)t%h 'α
(6,h)
0 %α
(6,h)
1 Mt%α
(6,h)
2 Yt%ε
(6,h)
t%h
analogous manner to the information in Table 2A. The table reports 6 out of  the 12 regressions computed. The sample contains 192 monthly observations from
1987:12 to 2003:11.
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(6,h)
t &Z
(6,h)
t R
2 ChowTest
p-value
h=1 -1.002 
(1.371)
 0.142 * 
(0.079)
 0.015
(0.091)
 0.151 
(0.188)
-0.820 
(0.604)
-0.693 †
(0.138)
 0.119
(0.113)
-1.028 
(1.614)
-3.309 †
(0.267)
0.575  0.087
h=3  1.153 
(1.103)
-0.211 †
(0.089)
-0.069
(0.082)
 0.105
(0.160)
 0.338 
(0.510)
-0.337 †
(0.105)
-0.037 
(0.097)
-2.170 †
(0.871)
-1.703 †
(0.161)
0.470 0.772
h=5  2.342 
(1.432)
-0.380 †
(0.066)
-0.071 
(0.098)
 0.008
(0.196)
 1.114 *
(0.648)
 0.054
(0.123)
-0.079
(0.102)
-1.084 *
(0.562)
-0.876 †
(0.156)
0.455 0.226
h=7  2.835 †
(1.300)
-0.422 †
(0.075)
-0.075 
(0.082)
 0.013
(0.178)
 1.311 †
(0.613)
-0.032
(0.109)
-0.040
(0.106)
-0.816 †
(0.384)
-0.605 †
(0.102)
0.540 0.005
h=9  3.448 †
(1.102)
-0.368 †
(0.074)
-0.042 
(0.059)
-0.074
(0.145)
 1.579 †
(0.546)
-0.137 
(0.091)
-0.034
(0.080)
-0.936 †
(0.377)
-0.619 †
(0.105)
0.649 0.051
h=12  4.069 †
(1.253)
-0.401 †
(0.059)
-0.004 
(0.050)
-0.173
(0.162)
 1.812 †
(0.619)
-0.176 †
(0.085)
 0.024
(0.054)
-0.683 †
(0.212)
-0.388 †
(0.098)
0.664 0.114
3.2 Evaluating the Results
Considering Tables 2A-2C combined, we find that the pro-cyclical variable NFP used by
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004), and the yield variables used by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) are,
indeed, important components of the risk premium. We note however that only the first factor of past
yields is consistently significant.  Our central concern is the size and sign of the belief  variables. 
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Starting with a statistical perspective, the effect of market belief is significant, large and
compatible in sign with the Risk Premium hypothesis in (23b). This constitutes an empirical support
for the hypothesis that, like society at large, markets are moved by perceptions. Fluctuations of real
pro-cyclical variables account for some variability of risk premia but variations in market perceptions,
which may express mistaken interest rate forecasts, are at least as important. Recalling our orientation
convention, parameters of the mean market beliefs  in Tables 2A-2C are always negative, they&Z (X,h)t
are large, always statistically significant and key contributors to the high . Table 3 below provides aR2
quantitative assessment of the contribution of these belief variables. Our hypothesis in (23b) is also
compatible with the empirical results of Campbell and Diebold (2009) and Baker and Wurgler (2006).
The parameters of  which measure market diversity, tend to be statistically significant forσ(X,h)t ,
longer time horizons. However, in the 6-month T Bill market these parameters  are consistently
significant for all horizons h > 2. For  3-month T Bills they are consistently significant at intermediate
and longer horizons, h = 3,4,10,11,12. With one exception, the estimates are always negative and
large. This result says that  an increase in diversity of market opinions decreases the risk premium.
This same result was derived in our earlier theoretical work (see Kurz and Motolese (2001)). The
explanation given is simple: markets with more diverse beliefs are more stable since beliefs cancel each
other out, resulting in reduced price volatility. In essence, with increased diversity the effects of the
law of large numbers are more pronounced. The converse holds as well: markets are more risky the
higher is the degree of unanimity in them. In such markets small changes in market news result in sharp
change of prices when “too many people try to get through the same door.” In Kurz and Motolese
(2001) agents are risk averse without any constraints on credit or short-sales . Our empirical results
are consistent with Miller (1977). However, the theoretical justification given by Miller’s (1977) model
hinges upon the imposition of short-sale constraints. Our results are also compatible with earlier results
in the financial economics literature (see Diether et al. (2002), Park (2005)). 
Non- Stationarity. Our theory hinges on agents not knowing the true structure of the economy since
it exhibits non-stationarity. In that case the risk premium has to exhibit non-stationarity as well. To test
for parameter time variability we could select dates when structural changes have been studied by
others. Our view is that forecast functions change for many reasons and practically any date will do for
a Chow test. Since the periods 1988:10- 2003:11 for Fed Funds and 1987:12- 2003:11 for T Bills are
6 The Diebold-Mariano statistics have been computed according to the procedure reported in Aiolfi and Favero
(2005), Appendix B.
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relatively short, we chose the mid-points of 1996:04 and 1995:11 to maximize the number of
observations per period. For these sub - periods we conduct Chow tests of parameter time variability.
In Tables 2A-2C, presented earlier, we report parameter estimates for the entire period and, in the last
columns, p-values of Chow tests for breaks in the two chosen dates. Almost all Chow tests lead to a
rejection of the hypothesis of structural parameter time invariance in all markets. The Chow tests are
particularly significant since we have only 91 observations for Fed Futures and 96 for T Bills in each of
the sub periods.
3.2.1. Robustness of the results.
We report in Table 3 the contributions of all belief variables to the .  Keeping in mind theR 2
limitation of the  we attach to it the Standard Errors of the regression. To further test theR 2
robustness of the results, we also report the statistics of an in-sample Diebold-Mariano test6. Table 3
reveals that belief variables explain a significant proportion of the risk premium.  At almost all 
Table  3: Contribution of Belief to Excess Returns Predictability
Note: the adjusted   of the regressions with beliefs are those reported in Tables 2A-2C. The  and standardR 2 R 2
errors of the regressions without beliefs are those of   which is (24) without theπ(X,h)t%h 'α
(X,h)
0 %α
(X,h)
1 Mt%ε
(X,h)
t%h
belief vector . The Diebold and Mariano test statistic is used to test the null of equal fitness between the twoYt
models. * and † denote significance  respectively at the 10%  and  5%  level. 
Asset Horizon
Without Beliefs With Beliefs
Diebold
Mariano
Statistic R 2 Std. Errors of
the regression
R 2 Std. Errors of
the regression
Fed Fund
Futures
h=1
h=3
h=6
-0.005
 0.139
 0.345
0.119
0.280
0.479
0.237
0.311
0.407
0.103
0.250
0.455
-1.922 *
-2.226 †
-0.848   
3 Months
T-Bill
h=1
h=3
h=5
h=7
h=9
h=12
 0.062
 0.208
 0.309
 0.425
 0.489
 0.595
0.671
0.368
0.306
0.254
0.247
0.214
0.482
0.450
0.391
0.466
0.607
0.673
0.499
0.307
0.287
0.245
0.216
0.192
 -6.125 † 
-3.794 †
-2.349 †
-1.834 *
-3.096 †
-3.300 †
6 Months
T-Bill
h=1
h=3
h=5
h=7
h=9
h=12
 0.077
 0.219
 0.349
 0.462
 0.541
 0.600
1.371
0.836
0.657
0.551
0.492
0.431
0.444
0.451
0.494
0.596
0.638
0.664
0.930
0.689
0.601
0.510
0.430
0.395
 -6.078 † 
-3.757 †
-2.710 †
-2.537 †
-2.639 †
-2.642 †
horizons the regressions which include belief variables outperform significantly those without. This is
7  The results are reported in an earlier version of this paper dated 12\ 4\ 2008 available upon request.  
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seen from the consistent lower Standard Errors of the regressions with belief variables. Furthermore,
the Diebold-Mariano statistics are very significant. Their negative sign indicates that the total distance
between the fitted and realized excess holding returns is lower in the models with belief variables than
in those without. These two conclusions strengthen our results.
As indicated in Section 2.2 we constructed  with the aim of extracting the component ofZ (X,h)t
beliefs in forecast data which is uncorrelated with state variables. Being an estimate, some correlation
remains between and the macro variable  in equation (24) and one may question the effect ofZ (X,h)t Mt
such correlation on our results. To estimate this effect we removed from the effect of a wide setZ (X,h)t
of macro variables reported monthly. This includes all the variables  in the regression models (24)Mt
as well as the lagged rate of unemployment, the lagged year over year change in industrial production
and the lagged year over year change in housing starts. The orthogonalization is carried out by
regressing  on the above variables and removing from them the predictable components whileZ (X,h)t
keeping the unconditional means unchanged. The results are virtually the same as reported in Tables
2A-2C hence are not repeated here7.
3.2.2 What Do Belief Variables Contribute?
Turning Points. To see how belief variables contribute to risk premium we exhibit in Figures
3-5 the fitted and realized excess holding returns for a sample of three of our models, in accord with
the estimates in Tables 2A-2C. The figures show that the results for Fed Funds futures are less precise
than the results for T Bills. However, we note the great success of our estimated model in predicting
the turning points of the time series. This high accuracy is the crucial contribution of the belief
variables in capturing the time variability of the market’s risk premia. One may also note that the belief
variables enable the fitted values to match the realized data at high frequency within the broader
cyclical pattern.
To sum up our findings, from the econometric point of view we confirm the result of earlier
work which shows that pro-cyclical fundamental variables are important components of the time
variability of the risk premium. The new fundamental forces proposed in this paper are the beliefs of
agents. These variables make a statistically significant contribution to the risk premium.
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Figure 3: Excess returns on Fed Fund Futures contract 3 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values
from regression (24) 
Figure 4: Excess returns on 3 Months TBill 6 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from
regression (24)
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Figure 5: Excess returns on 6 Months TBill 6 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from
regression (24)
8 As pointed out earlier, theory requires that each market belief have a long term time average equal to zero. Due to
the short time span of the sample periods we have considered, the time averages of   are not zero. Z
(X,h)
t
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Magnitude of the Effect of Market Belief on the Risk Premium. We now evaluate the order of
 magnitude of the effects of beliefs on risk premia. Note first, that we cannot evaluate the total effect
since we do not have a measure of the constant effect of market beliefs on long term volatility of asset
returns, as measured by  in (23a). We can only measure the variable effect of .[
r σˆ2Q
R τ
] (σ(X,h)t , &Z
(X,h)
t )
Hence, our estimates are lower bounds only. To that end we provide in Table 4 some long term 
statistics on the belief variables during the period8 at hand.
Together with the estimated parameters in Tables 2A-2C we assess the effects, on market
premia, of these variables measured in units of standard deviations.  Such computations provide an
idea of the order of magnitude of the effect of these changes. To illustrate the effect we consider two
 cases: decreased optimism and increased diversity of market opinions.
Table 4: Long Term Statistics of Belief Variables (in basis points)
σ
(F,h)
t σ
(3,h)
t σ
(6,h)
t Z
(F,h)
t Z
(3,h)
t Z
(6,h)
t
Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev. Avg. Std dev.
h=1 10.4 6.8 15.4 7.4 16.7 7.7 4.5 26.9 7.5 32.4 10.9 36.6
h=3 17.4 9.0 22.7 9.3 24.0 9.4 15.6 41.7 14.5 31.9 20.0 34.6
h=5 25.9 12.1 30.9 12.7 32.3 12.4 26.4 52.5 24.7 39.6 28.9 41.0
h=6 30.4 14.1 35.1 14.4 36.3 13.8 27.3 52.8 25.2 41.6 29.3 42.3
h=7 ---- ---- 39.2 15.7 40.6 15.4 ---- ---- 27.3 46.5 31.7 47.1
h=9 ---- ---- 46.9 17.6 48.2 17.2 ---- ---- 28.7 56.2 34.2 59.0
h=12 ---- ---- 56.7 18.4 57.6 17.9 ---- ---- 33.1 73.1 39.6 75.4
(1) The effect of decreased optimism. If we set   equal to two standard deviations above its meanZ (X,h)t
during the studied period as in Table 4, the total effect on the risk premium is as follows:
-0.397×(-(27.3+105.4)) = +52.68 bp in the Federal Fund Futures Market when h = 6;
-0.180×(-(33.1+146.2)) = +32.27 bp in the 3 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12;
-0.388×(-(39.6+150.8)) = +73.88 bp in the 6 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12.
Together with the estimated parameters in Tables 2A-2C we assess the effects, on market premia, of
these variables measured in units of standard deviations.  Such computations provide an idea of the
order of magnitude of the effect of these changes. To illustrate the effect we consider two cases:
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decreased optimism and increased diversity of market opinions.
(1) The effect of decreased optimism. If we set   equal to two standard deviations above its meanZ (X,h)t
during the studied period as in Table 4, the total effect on the risk premium is as follows:
-0.397×(-(27.3+105.4)) = +52.68 bp in the Federal Fund Futures Market when h = 6;
-0.180×(-(33.1+146.2)) = +32.27 bp in the 3 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12;
-0.388×(-(39.6+150.8)) = +73.88 bp in the 6 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12.
(2) The effect of diversity of market opinions. If we set  equal to two standard deviations aboveσ(X,h)t
its mean during the studied period as in Table 6, the total effect on the risk premium is as follows:  
-0.413×(30.4+14.1) = -18.38 bp in the Federal Fund Futures Market when h = 6;
-0.403×(56.7+36.8) = -37.68 bp in the 3 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12;
-0.683×(57.6+35.8) = -63.79 bp in the 6 Months Treasury Bills Market when h = 12.
From the above we see that market pessimism can frequently account for an increase in the risk
premium of up to about 70 basis points while an increase in the diversity of market opinions can
frequently account for a decrease in the risk premium of up to about 60 basis points.
To measure the joint effect of the two belief variables  combined, weY (X,h)t '(σ
(X,h)
t , &Z
(X,h)
t )
denote by    the estimated value of the belief component of the risk premium in (24). J (X,h)t 'αˆ
(X,h)
2 CY
(X,h)
t
 may be positive or negative and could thus increase or decrease the premium at any date.J (X,h)t
Table 5: Component of Belief in the Premium (in basis points, annualized)
Fed Funds Futures 3 Months Treasury Bills 6 Months Treasury Bills
Mean
Premium |J
(F,h)| MeanPremium |J
(3,h)| MeanPremium
|J (6,h)|
h=1 41.2 54.1 46.1 38.3 68.1 88.6
h=3 49.1 46.5 32.5 21.9 55.2 50.8
h=5 67.5 46.5 28.2 12.0 53.0 31.7
h=6 68.8 34.0 27.2 11.5 54.2 34.9
h=7 ---- ---- 27.9 7.8 71.8 27.8
h=9 ---- ---- 28.8 16.5 69.8 39.3
h=12 ---- ---- 38.9 18.5 66.1 33.2
To measure an order of magnitude of the component of the risk premium at t relative to the meanJ (X,h)t
premium, let   be the mean of the .  Table 5 reports, for each asset, the unconditional|J (X,h)| |J (X,h)t |
annualized mean premium for the sample period and the annualized value of   . |J (X,h)|
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There are two conclusions one can draw from Table 5 about the belief component in the premium:
(i) The  component in the risk premium is large: for the assets at hand it is generally|J (X,h)|
larger than 50% of the mean premium. We remark that both the premium as well as  areJ (X,h)t
very volatile hence the range of the   component of the risk premium is wide.J (X,h)t
(ii) The  component is largest for short holding returns and declines to about 50% at|J (X,h)|
h=12.  For very short holding periods of less than 3 months this component may often
dominate the premium. 
The second result is consistent with the intuition that risk premia are dominated by market beliefs for
very short holding periods. This result is also compatible with the results reported in Table 3 that show
the  without the belief variables are very small for very short holding periods. R 2
We stress that may be negative or positive and in the long run may not contribute muchJ (X,h)t
to the mean premium itself. We also recall that the average risk premium contains the constant
component in (23a) which constitutes an important effect of the market beliefs on the volatility of asset
return and hence on the risk premium. We do not measure this effect here.
4. Final Comments: On Bull and Bear Markets
Excess volatility of asset returns above the level accounted by “fundamental” forces is a fact
contested by only very few economists. Asset price volatility does not imply time variability of risk
premia but the converse does hold true. The exhibited strong impact of market belief on risk premia
suggests two additional comments. First, it offers a demonstration that market perception is as
fundamental to asset pricing as the customary exogenous variables. Second, that market belief is
actually an observable state variable which can be used for a deeper understanding of the causes of
market dynamics. The terms “bull” or “bear” markets have a narrow meaning in an REE based asset
pricing theory according to which such markets are related to business cycles. Contrast this with the
fact that during the last half century business cycles have moderated while volatility of financial
markets has not declined and perhaps has increased. Accordingly, this paper suggests that beyond the
standard effect of business cycles one could broaden the definitions of bull or bear markets. “Bull”
markets have an added component of low risk premium caused by unusually positive market belief
about future asset payoff  while “bear” markets have a component of high risk premium caused by
unusually negative market perception about future asset payoff.
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APPENDIX A: The Rationality Conditions
In (8a)-(8c) pins down i’s perceived transition of hence it defines i’s belief about . Weg it (d
i
t%1,Z
i
t%1) (dt%1,Zt%1)
now explore the specific conditions which must be satisfied by the perception models (8a)-(8c). Note first that some
rationality conditions have already been imposed. First, we argued that rational agents exhibit fluctuating beliefs since a
constant belief which is not the stationary empirical transition is irrational. Second, as random variables,  must haveg it
an unconditional zero mean since beliefs are all about deviations from empirical frequencies. Third, any belief is a
conditional probability of a stationary joint system like (8a) -(8c) to which we turn now.  
For (8a)-(8c) to be a rational belief it must induce the same empirical distribution of the observables  as(dt ,Zt )
(7a)-(7b). In accord with Theorem 3, one then treats  symmetrically with other random variables and require that weg it
must have
(A)   Empirical distribution of process  = distribution of  
λ
g
dg
i
t %ρ
id
t%1
λ
g
Zg
i
t %ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
d
t%1
ρ
Z
t%1
-N
0
0
,
σ
2
d, 0,
0, σ2Z
, i.i.d.
To compute the implied statistics of the model we first compute the moments of the . From (8c), theg it
unconditional variance of   is   Hence, we have two sets of rationality conditions which followg it Var(g
i)'σ2g / (1&λ
2
Z)
from (A). The first arises from equating the covariance matrix
(i)  (ii)  (iii) .
(λgd)
2
σ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆ
2
d ' σ
2
d
(λgZ)
2
σ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆ
2
Z ' σ
2
Z
λ
g
dλ
g
Zσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆZd ' 0
The second set arises from equating the serial correlations of the two systems
    (iv)    (v) .
(λgd)
2
λZσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% Cov(ρˆidt , ρˆ
id
t%1) ' 0
(λgZ)
2
λZσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% Cov(ρˆiZt , ρˆ
iZ
t%1) ' 0
(i) -(iii) fix the covariance matrix in (8a)-(8c) and (vi)-(v) fix the serial correlation of . An inspection of (8a)-( ρˆidt , ρˆ
iZ
t )
(8c) reveals the choice left for an agent are the two parameters . But under the rational belief theory these are not(λgd ,λ
g
Z)
free either since there are natural conditions they must satisfy. First, place two strict conditions on
σˆ
2
d > 0 , σˆ
2
Z > 0
:(λgd , λ
g
Z )
   , .|λgd | <
σd
σg
1 & λ2Z |λ
g
Z | <
σZ
σg
1 & λ2Z
Finally, one needs to ensure the covariance matrix in (8a)-(8c) is positive definite. The following is a sufficient condition
    
1 & λ2Z
σ
2
g
>
(λgZ)
2
σ
2
Z
%
(λgd)
2
σ
2
d
The “free” parameters  are thus restricted to a narrow range which is empirically testable.(λgd , λ
g
Z )
APPENDIX B: Derivation of the Value Function
For simplicity we ignore in this Appendix the index i identifying the agent who carries out the optimization.
Hence, the dynamic programming problem is as follows. Given initial values ,  maximize(θ0 , W0 )
 Ut ' Et
(θ , C)
[
j
4
s ' 0
&β
t%s&1e
&( 1
τ
Ct%s)
| Ht]
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subject to the following definitions
Wt%1 ' (Wt & Ct )R % θt Qt%1
 Qt%1 ' pt%1 % (dt%1 % μ) & ptR
 ψt ' (1 , dt , zt , gt )
and stochastic transition functions
dt%1 ' λddt % λ
d
ggt % g
d
t%1
,    ,   .Zt%1 ' λzZt % λ
z
ggt % g
z
t%1 Λ
ψ
'
1 , 0 , 0 , 0
0 ,λd , 0 , λ
d
g
0 ,0 , λz , λ
z
g
0 ,0 , 0 , λz
gˆt' (1 ,g
d
t ,g
z
t ,g
g
t ) , (g
d
t , g
z
t , g
g
t ) - N(0 , Σ)
gt%1 ' λzgt % g
g
t%1
Step 1: simplification. We thus define, for the unknown matrix V 
  ,     Λ '
λd , 0 , λ
d
g
0 , λz , λ
z
g
0 , 0 , λz
V '
v00 , v01 , v02 , v03
v01
v02 V11
v03
'
v00 , vˆ
T
0
vˆ0 , V11
We now have    ,        where    is a 4×4 matrix
ψt%1 ' Λψψt % Λggˆt%1 Λg '
0 , 0
0 , I(3×3)
We assume that  and verify it later when we solve for equilibrium. Using this price mappt ' addt % azzt % P0
we can compute excess return in terms of the state variables we have that 
Qt%1' (ad % 1)[λd dt%λ
d
ggt%g
d
t%1]%az [λzZt%λ
z
ggt%g
z
t%1]%P0 & [addt%az Zt%P0]R % μ
Hence
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d
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Or,   
Qt%1 ' a
T
ψt % bˆ
T
gt%1 , hence Et[Qt%1] ' a
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d
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T
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Also, we shall use the notation    .  Now compute the expressionb T' ((ad%1) ,az ,0)
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Algebra and simplification leads to the conclusion that we have 
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Step 2: The Bellman Equation. It is well known (see, for example, the Appendix of Wang (1994)) that the Bellman
Equation for this problem with  is written in the formγ ' 1
τ
     for some parameter matrix VJt ' Max
(θt , Ct )
[&βt&1exp &γCt & β
t Etexp &At & e
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But we know that
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The first order conditions are then stated as follows. Equating the derivative with respect to  θ  to zero leads to 
& α[a T&b TΩΛ0]ψt % α
2
θtb
T
Ωb ' 0
And this proves equation (11) in the text which we can write in the more explicit form (since )Et[Qt%1] ' a
T
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αb TΩb
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This last equation determines the parameter vector u. It also shows that this vector is the same for all agents since the
assumption made in the text is that all agents are identically the same except for their belief states .  The last equationgt
shows that the vector u depends only upon parameters of the stochastic structure.   
Step 3: The Adjusted Variance and Constants. We can also explain the “adjustment” to the variance in (11) since 
 σˆ2Q ' b
T
Ωb
which is the variance of the excess return function where the covariance matrix used is not G but rather Ω. 
We now have 
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Now take the derivative with respect to C and equate to zero to obtain
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Hence the solution for C must satisfy (with log being the logarithm to base e)
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The final details of showing that the value function is indeed the solution of the Bellman Equation requires the insertion
of the optimal solutions into the Bellman Equation and deducing the unknown parameters. Doing this leads to the
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following conclusion. First define the term . Then it is demonstration that the unknown parameterGˆ '
1
γR
log(rβG)
α and matrix V are determined by the conditions 
(i) .  
α '
r γ
R
(ii) M
R
& V % 2[γ Gˆ % log( r
R
) ]i11 ' 0
where  is a 4×4 matrix with the (1,1) element being 1 and all others being 0.i11
